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Though brand loyalty has been studied extensively in the marketing literature, the re-
lationship between brand loyalty and equilibrium pricing strategies is not well understood.
Designing sales pricing strategies involves two key decisions: the percentage reduction in
price from the existing price point, and the number or frequency of promotions within a
category or for a speci￿c product. These decisions, in turn, are critically dependent upon
how many consumers can be convinced to switch to a brand by temporarily reducing its
price, and how many are instead brand loyal. Theoretical models of how the size and
strength of brand loyalty in￿ uence optimal promotion strategies have been developed,
but there are no rigorous tests of their hypotheses. We test how brand loyalty impacts
promotion strategies for a frequently purchased consumer package good category. Our
results largely con￿rm that retailers often promote many brands simultaneously and that
depth and breadth can be complementary.
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Recent estimates indicate that consumer packaged good manufacturers allocate fully 58% of
their marketing expenditure toward sales promotion (Low and Mohr, 2000). Despite the
popularity of retail price promotions, why supermarket retailers periodically o⁄er products
at discounted prices is not well understood, nor how promotions can exist in a competitive
equilibrium given the law of one price. Explaining how price promotions work, therefore, is
critically important in understanding competitive retail equilibria and the retailing function
more generally. Price promotions are typically measured along two dimensions: their depth,
or the percentage discount from a typical price, and their frequency, which is de￿ned as the
number of times a product is promoted during a given week. Consequently, this study seeks
to explain the frequency and depth of retail price promotions using a frequently purchased
food item as a case study. We ￿nd that some common assumptions of some theoretical models
that explain retail price promotion do not hold within the food category we investigate.
There are a number of studies that try to explain why retailers use sales, each of which
considers the competitive interactions of retailers or manufacturers. Varian (1980) develops
a retailer model in which sales are the result of a mixed strategy equilibrium brought on by
retailers competing over segments of the market that are relatively informed or uninformed.
He argues that price promotions are used by retailers trying to capture the informed con-
sumer￿ s business. However, his study only considers a single product, while retailing is
inherently multi-product. Pessendorfer (2002) argues that consumer demand increases over
time as inventories are drawn down and, consequently, retailers may use a form of intertem-
poral price discrimination through retail promotions to generate more pro￿ts. He empirically
investigates a consumer packaged goods category and concludes that the predicted probabil-
ity of a sale increases in the time since the last one, thus con￿rming his central hypothesis.
However, intertemporal demand is not an issue for most food products as they are at least
somewhat perishable. Loss leadership has also been proposed as a possible rationale for price
promotions (Hess and Gerstner, 1987; Walters, and McKenzie, 1988; Bliss, 1988; Epstein,
1998; and Hosken and Rei⁄en, 2001). These studies investigate the e⁄ect that promoting
one product ￿even below cost ￿has on overall sales. However, these studies often do not
include manufacturer competition within their model, neglecting the e⁄ect trade deals have
1on a retailer￿ s incentive to promote a product. Others extend this research to include the
competitive interaction among retailers (Chintagunta, 2002; and Richards, 2006). Measur-
ing promotion as both the depth and breadth of a price change, Richards (2006) ￿nds that
promotions will likely have their greatest impact on in-store product share, but promotions
can increase store share if consumers regard the retailers has highly substitutable. However
he looks at pro￿ts among categories, which may not extend to products within a category.
Common among these studies is the notion that retailers can exploit some form of segmen-
tation strategy, whether identifying informed and uninformed consumers, high valuation and
low valuation groups, or brand loyalty and non-loyal buyers, to price discriminate across
consumers. The speci￿c mechanisms by which they do so, however, is a matter for further
research.
Recognizing that some consumers have a preference for one brand over another, re-
searchers in marketing tend to focus on brand loyalty to explain price promotion as an
equilibrium outcome. Raju, Srinivasan, and Lal (1990) develop a theoretical model that
explains how di⁄erences in loyalty leads to variations in the depth and frequency of price
promotions o⁄ered by brands in the same product category.1 Agrawal (1996) extends this
theoretical model to examine how media advertising and promotion interact for manufac-
turers of consumer packaged goods. His model suggests that a retailer would o⁄er deeper
discounts for brands with little brand loyalty and promote them less often compared to a
brand with more loyal consumers. Similar to Agrawal (1996), Jing, and Wen (2008) develop
a model that assumes consumers will switch to a preferred brand given a su¢ cient price
discount, but also include the possibility of a consumer segment that is completely price
sensitive. They ￿nd that the equilibrium promotional strategy depends critically on the
brand strength and the number of price sensitive consumers. However, these studies do not
consider competitive interactions among retailers. Lal and Villas-Boas (1998) extend these
theoretical models further by including either loyalty to a retailer, a brand, both a retailer
and brand, or neither. Their model suggests that when retailer loyalty is introduced, the
promotional equilibrium allows for the possibility of promoting more than one brand. All of
these studies assume, however, that loyalty is exogenous to the promotion strategy.
Among empirical studies, Huang, Perlo⁄, and Villas-Boas (2006) challenge this assump-
1For example Guadagni and Little, (1983); and Ortmeyer, Lattin and Montgomery, (1987)
2tion and ￿nd that promotional frequency e⁄ects the share of loyal consumers so that, indeed,
loyalty is endogenous. They investigate the relationship between retailer promotions and
customer choice across brands within a speci￿c consumer packaged goods category, conclud-
ing that very little brand loyalty exists. Their ￿ndings suggest, at least within the consumer
packaged good category they investigated, that brand loyalty likely cannot constitute an ex-
planation for equilibrium promotional strategies. However, their result depends critically on
their de￿nition of loyalty. Loyalty can be de￿ned as either a time-series method of previous
purchase patterns, or as the discount needed to persuade a loyal consumer to switch to a
less preferred brand, often referred to as the ￿ money-metric￿measure. The measure of re-
peat purchase assumes that past purchase decisions will be an indicator of future purchasing
decision (Knox and Walker, 2001). Though this measure is able to capture the behavioral
aspect of brand loyalty, it does not take into account the attitudinal aspects. Consequently
our empirical analysis of brand loyalty follows Pessemier (1959) and operationalizes it as
the price di⁄erential needed to persuade a consumer who prefers one brand, switch to a less
preferred brand. This ￿ money metric￿measure is able to capture both the attitudinal and
behavioral elements and is commonly used in theoretical studies on equilibrium promotion
to operationalize the measure of brand loyalty.
Most of the theoretical studies on equilibrium promotion revolve around a duopoly as-
sumption, which only holds in a limited number of applications. This assumption does not
allow for complementarity that can exist among products in a retail environment ￿comple-
mentary that can drive sales on multiple products. Furthermore, many models are built upon
a duopoly assumption which may or may not extend to categories which have a large num-
ber of di⁄erentiated products. Our empirical study will relax the overly restrictive duopoly
framework in developing a new empirical model of promotion strategy.
Though brand loyalty has been studied extensively in the marketing literature, the re-
lationship between brand loyalty and equilibrium pricing strategies is not well understood.
Retailer￿ s promotional decisions are critically dependent upon how many consumers can be
convinced to switch to a brand by temporarily reducing its price, and how many are in-
stead brand loyal. Theoretical models of how the size and strength of brand loyalty in￿ uence
optimal promotion strategies have been developed, but there are no rigorous tests of their
hypotheses. As a result, the objective of this research is to empirically determine how brand
3loyalty, measured by the size and strength of loyal cohorts, in￿ uences equilibrium promotional
strategy for di⁄erentiated products by multi-product retailers.
Constructing an empirical test, however, ￿rst requires a clear theoretical framework to
derive equilibrium promotional strategies. Building on theoretical studies of brand loyalty
and promotion, we develop a theoretical model that describes the relationship between brand
loyalty and promotion in multi-product retailer equilibria. Our empirical analysis focuses
on the ready to eat (RTE) cereal category which is an ideal case study for a number of
reasons. First, the RTE cereal industry is highly concentrated at the manufacturing level.
Despite being highly concentrated, Nevo (2001) and Norman, Pepall, and Richards (2005)
conclude that the high price cost margins are generally attributed to product di⁄erentiation
and multi-product ￿rm pricing. Second, cereal manufacturers often introduce new brands
into a highly di⁄erentiated market (Hausman, 1997), attempting to win consumers loyal to
a competing brand. High concentration and strong brands lead to ￿erce brand rivalry in
both prices and product development. These attributes make the industry well-suited to
empirically determining how brand loyalty in￿ uences equilibrium promotional strategies by
retailers and manufacturers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the
RTE cereal industry and why we focus on this category for the empirical analysis. The third
section develops the theoretical and empirical models of brand loyalty. A fourth describes
the econometric methods used to estimate the models developed in the third section, while
the ￿fth section describes the data used to estimate the model. The results are presented in
the sixth section, while the ￿nal section concludes, describes the implications for the study of
the interaction among brand loyalty and promotional equilibrium, and provides suggestions
for future work in the area.
2 The Ready to Eat Cereal Industry
The RTE cereal industry has many desirable characteristics that ￿t well with the purposes
of this study. First, the industry has seen relatively stagnant growth in overall consumption
for the past several years. With stagnant growth, ￿rms will have to actively promote their
products. Second, cereal manufacturers produce a wide variety of highly di⁄erentiated
products. Third, RTE cereal products are frequently purchased during regular shopping
4trips which allows for a larger role for loyal purchases. Finally, the RTE cereal industry is
largely dominated by three manufacturers, with some private label products sold at the retail
level.
The RTE cereal industry is characterized with a number of di⁄erentiated products charac-
terized with ￿erce brand rivalry. The RTE cereal industry, like the food processing industry
in general, has few manufacturers each selling multiple brands, making it a concentrated
di⁄erentiated-products market. Within the U.S. Kellogg, General Mills, and Post Cereal ac-
counted for 70.9, 68.0, and 68.1% of the RTE Cereal category sales for 2004, 2005, and 2006
respectively. Furthermore, private label sales account for 14.5, 15.6, and 15.4% of the cereal
category sales for 2004, 2005, and 2006 respectively (Source: A.C. Nielson Homescan data).
Despite being highly concentrated, Nevo (2001) and Norman, Pepall, and Richards (2005)
conclude the high price cost margins are generally attributed to product di⁄erentiation and
multi-product ￿rm pricing. This suggests that brand loyalty likely exists with the industry.
Consumption levels of RTE cereal have remained fairly constant over the last several
years causing the manufacturers to compete over marketshare, thereby making brand loyalty
all the more important. A.C. Nielsen Homescan data suggests that the total consumption
of RTE cereal in 2006 was just under 3.1 billion pounds for a total of $7.9 billion in sales
which is very similar to 1995 estimates. General Mills and Post have been able to maintain
their marketshare since the early 1990￿ s (Nevo, 2001), currently hovering around 22% and
12% respectively. During that time the private label producers were capturing about 7% of
the market, but have since been able to gain twice as much market share coming in at about
15%. This has been much to the disappointment of Kellogg who has seen their market share
drop from the early 1990 levels of about 35% to a current level of 25%. From 2004 to 2006
Quaker Oaks (owned by PepsiCo) and Malt-O-Meal had just over 5% of the market. All
other cereal manufacturers account for less than half a percent of the marketshare. This
high concentration of the industry in general, and ￿erce struggle for marketshare has caused
prices to decrease over the years.
With consumption remaining relatively constant and new brands being continually intro-
duced in an e⁄ort to gain marketshare, the industry has seen the retail price of RTE cereals
decrease over the years. The average price of all RTE cereals dropped almost 20% since
2000 levels when adjusted for in￿ ation. From table 1 we can see private label prices have
5decreased 13% over the same time period while on average remaining almost 35% cheaper
than the overall average. Such a large discount has probably contributed to the reduction
in the price of all other cereal brands. We can also see from table 1 that though General
Mill￿ s brands have undergone a similar price decrease over time, they have still been able
to maintain generally higher prices compared to the overall average. Except for Kellogg￿ s
Rice Krispy, Kellogg￿ s brands are generally priced lower than the overall average. If we look
closely at Kellogg￿ s Frosted Mini-Wheat we can see that the brand was losing market share
through 2003 until it lowered the price, at which point it began gaining marketshare back.
However, a similar pricing strategy was undertaken by Kellogg￿ s Frosted Flakes and it still
lost market share through 2006. Lastly, we can see that though Post￿ s brands have followed
a similar decrease in price over the past several years when adjusted for in￿ ation, and most
of the brands have been able to maintain a steady market share.
Insert Marketshare Table Here
The downward pressure in prices is likely the result of the RTE cereal industry being
dominated by three manufacturers each competing over marketshare. This competition for
marketshare makes brand loyalty all the more important. Despite this downward pressure,
the industry still has a vast range of prices among the di⁄erent products and their man-
ufacturers. This variety in prices along with being a frequently purchased product group
allows for a better understanding of consumer￿ s preferences. These attributes makes the
industry ideal for empirically determining how brand loyalty changes retailer￿ s equilibrium
promotional strategy for di⁄erentiated products.
3 Theoretical Brand Loyalty Model
In this section, we develop a theoretical model of price promotions in which brand loyalty
plays an important role. We then develop a model to empirically test the hypotheses implied
by the theoretical model. In general, designing sales promotion strategies involves two key
decisions: (1) the depth of the promotion, or the percentage reduction in price from the
existing price point, and (2) the breadth, meaning the number or frequency of promotions
within a category, or for a speci￿c product. Several studies have sought to explain the
promotional phenomenon, of which brand loyalty has played a signi￿cant role. However,
6theoretical models of brand loyalty provide mixed results as to their role in framing retailers￿
promotional strategies. Furthermore, debate still remains as to the way in which brand
loyalty can be de￿ned, operationalized, and applied to the retail setting.
How a retailer de￿nes brand loyalty, or loyalty more generally, can a⁄ect their decisions
regarding the depth and frequency of promotions in a fundamental way. How they de￿ne
loyalty is re￿ ected in the measure they use to assess whether a consumer is likely to purchase
again, or switch to another brand. Inaccurate measures of brand loyalty could result in
promoting products either too deeply, or too frequently, or not deeply or frequently enough,
which will erode a retailer￿ s category and store pro￿ts. Studies of brand loyalty often follow
Pessemier (1959) and de￿ne loyalty as the price di⁄erential needed to make a consumer who
prefers one brand switch to a less preferred brand. This concept is able to capture both
the strength and "size" of a loyal segment. Strength is often thought of as the intensity of
a consumer￿ s loyalty towards a brand, and size being the number of consumers in the loyal
cohort. This measure also captures both the attitudinal and behavioral elements of brand
loyalty as it assumes that the consumer has some preference for a brand (attitudinal) and then
measures the degree of preference by observed purchasing incidents over time (behavioral).
A price-based measure of loyalty is in contrast to a temporal measure of loyalty which uses
repeat purchase behavior to measure brand loyalty. Repeat-purchase measures assume that
past purchase decisions will be an indicator of future purchasing decision (Knox and Walker,
2001). Though these measures are able to capture the behavioral aspect of brand loyalty,
they are not able to account for the attitudinal. As a result, in our theoretical model we
operationalize brand loyalty as the discount needed to make a consumer who prefers one
brand, switch to another. This measure is the same measure used by Agrawal (1996) and
Villas-Boas and Lal (1998), while Guadagni and Little (1983) and Bucklin and Lattin (1991)
are examples of studies that use a repeat-purchase measure.
Theoretical studies of brand loyalty generally model a duopoly market where brands com-
pete for loyal cohorts of consumers. Assumptions regarding loyalty range from models that
assume all consumers prefer a brand (Raju, Srinivasan, and Lal 1990; Agrawal 1996; and
Lal and Villas-Boas 1998) to others that assume market shares are driven by the cheapest
brand (Narasimhan 1988; Knox and Walker 2001; and Jing, and Wen 2008). Furthermore,
studies vary on the level of competition assumed. In general, as the theoretical literature
7has progressed researchers have built upon previous models to include deeper levels of com-
petition, or relaxing some fundamental assumptions of the model. For example, Lal and
Villas-Boas (1998) extend Agrawal (1996) by modeling both retailer and manufacturer com-
petition. These studies ￿nd that market structure assumption plays an important role in
the ￿nal promotional equilibrium of the retailer. However, rigorous empirical tests have yet
to be conducted, even on the most basic models used in each theoretical study. As a result,
we develop a theoretical model of brand loyalty following Raju, Srinivasan, and Lal (1990)
and Agrawal (1996) that describes the in￿ uence brand loyalty has on price-promotions in
a multi-product retailer equilibrium. Since our objective is to empirically determine how
brand loyalty in￿ uences retailer￿ s equilibrium promotional strategy for di⁄erentiated prod-
ucts, we focus on the hypotheses implied by these simpler models, and leave tests of more
comprehensive models to future empirical work.
3.1 Model
Our model consists of two national brands: s and w. We assume that the two brands are
sold nationally in a market with M consumers. We let the market consist of consumers who
have a preference for one brand over the other, but can be persuaded to switch to the less
preferred brand if a su¢ cient discount is given. We assume that the proportion of consumers
loyal to brand s is ms and the proportion loyal to brand w is mw, such that ms + mw = 1:
Furthermore, for those consumers loyal to brand s we assume a reservation price r for brand
s and a lower reservation price for brand w of (r ￿ ls). Similarly we assume a reservation
price for those consumers loyal to brand w of r and a lower reservation price of (r ￿ lw) for
brand s. We assume that it takes a larger price di⁄erential to persuade a customer loyal to
s to switch to w such that 0 < lw ￿ ls. In general we assume that promotions only a⁄ect
brand shares and not the category volume sold. Thus, each consumer is assumed to buy one
unit of a brand per shopping trip such that utility is maximized. So the demand function
for brand s and w can be seen below (Agrawal, 1996):
8Ds(ps;pw) =
( M if ps < pw ￿ lw
Mms if ps ￿ ls ￿ pw ￿ ps ￿ lw
0 if pw < ps ￿ ls
and
Dw(ps;pw) =
( M if pw < ps ￿ ls
Mmw if pw ￿ lw ￿ ps ￿ pw ￿ ls
0 if ps < pw ￿ lw
where ps and pw represent the retail price of the brands s and w respectively. The above
demand speci￿cation states that if brand i 2 fs;wg;i 6= j is discounted below the retail price
of j minus the loyalty factor lj then the consumers loyal to brand i will switch to brand j. If
however, the price of brand i is lower than the price of brand j, but not lower than the price
of brand j minus the loyalty factor of lj then the consumers loyal to brand i will stick with
brand i.
While manufacturers simultaneously declare wholesale prices ws and ww for their respec-
tive brands, we assume they don￿ t set wholesale prices strategically. After observing the
wholesale prices, the retailer strategically sets retail prices ps and pw for the two brands
so as to maximize category pro￿ts. We assume that the marginal cost of production and
distribution for the two manufacturers, and the marginal cost of retailing are zero.
3.1.1 Retailer Pricing Strategy
The retailer￿ s pro￿t function is represented below:
￿R =
( (ps ￿ ws)M if ps < pw ￿ lw ￿ r
ms(ps ￿ ws)M + mw(pw ￿ ww)M if ps ￿ ls ￿ pw ￿ ps ￿ lw ￿ r
(pw ￿ ww)M if pw < ps ￿ ls ￿ r
The retailer￿ s pro￿t function above allows for three distinct possibilities with which pro￿ts
can be maximized. If the stronger brand is cheaper than the di⁄erence between the weaker
brand price and the consumer￿ s loyalty factor then the retailer will promote the weaker brand
and sell it to both segments. If the weaker brand￿ s wholesale price is not su¢ ciently lower
than the strong brand then the retailer would simply sell both brands to the loyal segments.
If however the weaker brand is su¢ ciently cheaper as to capture the loyal consumers of
the stronger brand, then the retailer would discount the weaker brand and sell it the entire
population segment. It can be shown that in equilibrium the optimal pricing strategy for
the retail is as follows (Agrawal, 1996):
9￿ if ww > ws + (1=mw)lw then charge ps = r ￿ lw ￿ ￿;pw = r;
￿ if ws + (1=mw)lw ￿ ww ￿ ws + (1=mw)lw then charge ps = r and pw = r ; and ￿nally
￿ if ws > ww + (1=ms)ls then charge pw = r ￿ ls ￿ ￿;ps = r.
It is important to note that the retailer is maximizing pro￿ts for the overall category.
As a result they always have the option to sell both brands at the reservation price to the
corresponding loyal segments of the market. The retailer only discounts one of the brands if
the wholesale price o⁄ered for that brand is low enough to warrant a higher pro￿t by selling
the one brand at a discounted rate to the entire market.
This equilibrium pricing strategy leads to several hypotheses about the frequency and
depth of discounts o⁄ered by a retailer. First, deeper discounts are given by the retailer for
the weaker brand in comparison to the stronger brand. This this result follows directly from
the optimal pricing strategy above because the weaker brand has to o⁄er a larger discount ls
in order to attract the stronger brand￿ s loyal customers and 0 < lw ￿ ls. In other words,
￿ H1: the average price discount at the retail level is negatively related to the strength
of brand loyalty.
In equilibrium the retailer promotes the stronger brand with a probability: Pr[ww >
ws + (1=mw)lw], and promotes the weaker brand with probability: Pr[ws > ww + (1=ms)ls]:
Given the asymmetry in loyalties (lw ￿ m2
wr and ls ￿ ms(r ￿ lw)(1 + msmw)￿1) (Raju,
Srinivasan, and Lal, 1990) it follows that the probability of the weaker brand obtaining the
consumers loyal to the stronger brand is zero, which suggests that the retailer will promote
the stronger brand more frequently. In other words,
￿ H2: the frequency of price promotions at the retail level is positively related to the
strength of brand loyalty.
Since these hypotheses follow directly from the model described above, their support or
rejection will give valuable insight into the underlying assumptions of our theoretical model.
For example H1 will be able to shed light on the validity of the underlying assumption of the
measure of brand loyalty. If H1 is rejected then our de￿nition and distinction of the stronger
or weaker brand would be fundamentally ￿ awed and our operationalization of brand loyalty
10should be reconsidered. Similarly, rejection of H2 may indicate that retailers use promotions
strategically to compete with other retailers even at the product level as suggested by Lal and
Villas-Boas (1998). In the section that follows we develop an empirical model of consumer
demand that provides household-level estimates of brand preference. These estimates will
then be used to test H1 and H2:
4 Empirical Model of Brand Loyalty
In this section we develop an empirical model of brand loyalty designed to test the hypothe-
ses above. We estimate brand loyalty using a discrete choice approach, as opposed to a
representative consumer demand model. Representative consumer demand models assume
a consumer is, on the whole, average, and thus consumes a small amount of every brand in
the category (Anderson, de Palma and Thisse, 1992). By assuming that the market consists
of millions of representative, utility maximizing consumers, representative consumer demand
models try to explain how demand is likely to change if prices, income, or some other depen-
dent variable changes on the assumption that everyone is alike and has the same preferences.
Examples of representative consumer demand models include the Constant Elasticity of Sub-
stitution (CES) (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977), and the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS)
(Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980).
Representative consumer models, however, are generally written as systems of demand
equations, in which the interrelated nature of consumer demand is explicitly recognized. A
systems approach to demand estimation provides consistently better empirical results that
are more consistent with the underlying theory of constrained utility maximization elemen-
tary economic theory than single-equation alternatives. But, in a di⁄erentiated-product
environment, the assumption that consumers buy every product is not tenable. Rather,
when brands are di⁄erentiated, consumers prefer di⁄erent brands given they perceive prod-
uct attributes di⁄erently. Representative consumer demand models do not take into account
this consumer heterogeneity.
As an alternative to representative consumer demand models, Luce (1959) and McFadden
(1973) developed the logic that underlies discrete choice models. In a discrete choice frame-
work, consumers are assumed to buy the one brand that yields the greatest utility over all
other choices. Utility, however, is randomly distributed and depends upon the distribution
11of unobserved consumer preferences, or unobserved heterogeneity. By specifying a functional
form for the unobserved consumer heterogeneity, discrete choice models are able to more read-
ily capture why consumers buy particular brands. However, the parameters in the utility
function are assumed to be constant over consumers in the simple logit speci￿cation. This
assumption is convenient as a closed form demand equations results. Nonetheless, the simple
logit is subject to the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property, which means
that substitution patterns are based on market share instead of fundamental attributes of
the brand. In order to fully accommodate household heterogeneity we allow the parameters
to vary randomly, which causes substitution between brands to be based on brand attributes
instead of market share. This speci￿cation is not without cost, as the mixed logit no longer
yields a closed form demand equation. However, estimation of the closed form demand
equation is not necessary to empirically estimate the strength of loyalty for each product, nor
the size of the loyal segment. We describe the speci￿c model we use for this purpose in the
next section.
4.1 Consumer Demand
Breakfast cereals are highly di⁄erentiated food products. Consequently, we model their
demand using a discrete choice approach (Anderson, de Palma and Thisse, 1992; Jain, Vil-
cassim, and Chintagunta 1994; Nevo, 2001). Of all possible discrete choice models, we model
consumer demand with a random coe¢ cient logit model (RCL). Compared to the simple, and
nested logit forms, the RCL has several advantages. First, the partial derivatives of the brand
choice probability will not be determined by a single parameter as in the logit and nested logit
models. Instead, each household in the sample will have a di⁄erent price sensitivity, which
is important to the objectives of this study. Namely, the price response parameter di⁄ers
among brands, which provides an appropriate measure of the brand￿ s strength. Second, the
RCL model allows for ￿ exible substitution patterns, unlike the simple and nested alternatives
(within nests). Consumer heterogeneity is allowed to enter the model through a composite
random shock term that is dependent on product and individual characteristics. Thus, if
the price of a brand goes up, households are more likely to switch to a brand with similar
characteristics, as opposed to the one that, on average, is most often purchased. Third,
and because of this feature, households with similar characteristics will tend to have similar
12purchasing patterns.
Formally, we assume that a sample of H households h 2 f1;2;:::;Hg make a purchase
among N brands b 2 f1;2;:::;Ng on purchasing occasion t 2 f1;:::;Tg. Then the conditional
indirect utility of household h for alternative b on purchasing occasion t can be written as:
uhbt = ￿hb + ￿0xhbt ￿ ￿hbphbt + ￿hbt + ￿hbt (1)
where ￿hbt is an error term that accounts for all product-speci￿c variations in demand that are
unobserved by the econometrician.2Brand b￿ s price is represented by phbt, and ￿hb captures
the intrinsic preference of household h for brand b, ￿ is a k-dimensional vector of parameters
and xhbt is a vector of attributes of the household and the brand, which includes variables
such as household income, an indicator of whether the product is o⁄ered on a temporary
discount (dcbt), and an interaction term between the retail price and the discount (dcbtpbt)
(Chintagunta, 2002; Richards, 2006). By including an interaction term we allow for the
possibility that promotion rotates the demand curve in addition to the expected demand-
shifting e⁄ect. In this way, we allow items on promotion to become less elastic if households
perceive discounting as a means of di⁄erentiating otherwise similar products. These ex-
planatory variables, and their distribution over households, govern the substitution patterns
so that products with similar characteristics will be closer substitutes. Furthermore, we
assume that the error term ￿hbt is an i.i.d. type I extreme value error term that accounts
for household-speci￿c heterogeneity in preferences. With this error assumption, the utility
speci￿cation in (1) implies a discrete choice logit demand model.
It is well understood that a simple logit model su⁄ers from the IIA property. The
RCL model does not have this attribute because the correlation between random parameter
variation and attributes included in the demand model introduces a degree of curvature that
the simple logit lacks. In the RCL, we allow the product-preference and marginal utility of
income parameters in (1) to vary over consumers in a random way (BLP, 1995; Nevo, 2001).
Speci￿cally, the marginal utility of income is normally distributed over households such that:
￿hb = ￿ + ￿￿￿hb; ￿hb s N(0;1) (2)
2Because we use t to denote the time period and T to denote the total number of time periods we use a
￿
0￿ , instead of the traditional poscript T, to denote the transpose of a vector or matrix.
13where ￿ is the mean price response across all consumers and ￿hb is the household-speci￿c
variation in response with parameter ￿￿. We can decompose ￿
0
into f￿1;:::;￿L;￿L+1:::;￿kg
where the ￿rst L parameters are the random parameters, and the L + 1 parameters rep-
resent the non random parameters, such as the discount indicator and discount interaction
term. We decompose xhbt in a similar way. Households, therefore, are assumed to di⁄er in
their attribute preferences such that unobserved consumer heterogeneity is re￿ ected in the
distribution of each brand￿ s marginal utility in the following way:
￿hl = ￿l + ￿￿zhl + ￿￿vhl; vhl s N(0;1) l = 1;:::;L: (3)
where ￿l represents the ￿xed constant terms in the means of the distributions for the random
parameters, zhl represents a set of observed variables which do not vary over time and enter
the means of the random parameters, ￿￿ is the set of coe¢ cients that form the observation
speci￿c term in the mean, vhl is the random term representing the household￿ s unobserved
heterogeneity and ￿￿ is the coe¢ cient of the household￿ s unobserved heterogeneity. McFad-
den and Train (2000) interpret the elements of (3) in terms of an error-components model of
attribute demand. In contrast to the IIA property of a single logit model, the heterogeneity
assumption in (3) creates a general pattern of substitution over N alternatives through the
unobserved, random part of the utility function given in (1). As a result, the utility from
di⁄erent brands is correlated according to the set of attributes included in xhbt.
The mixed logit model introduces a large number of parameters relative to the simple
logit model. Therefore, we follow Nevo (2001), among others, and write the indirect utility
function in terms of two sets of variables - those that are assumed to be random and those
that are not:
uhbt = ￿hbt(phbt;xhbt;￿hbt;￿hb;￿hb;￿hl) + ￿hbt(phbt;￿hb;vhl;￿￿;￿￿;￿￿) + ￿hbt (4)
where ￿hbt is the mean utility level that varies over products, but not households, and ￿hbt
is the idiosyncratic part that varies by household and product. For convenience let ￿hbt =
￿hb +￿0xhbt ￿￿hbphbt +￿hbt: With this, the probability that household h chooses brand b at
purchasing occasion t conditional on ￿hl, and ￿hb can be written:
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where the utility of purchasing brand N has been normalized out.
The advantages of the RCL model do not come without a cost. Unlike the logit and nested
logit models, there is no analytical closed form for (5). In order to overcome this di¢ culty,
we integrate over the densities of the random parameters in the model. De￿ne the densities
of fvh1;:::;vhLg as ff(vh1);:::;f(vhL)g and ￿h as g(￿h) so that the unconditional probability
of household h purchasing brand b on purchasing occasion t is obtained by integrating over













which can then be estimated using simulated maximum likelihood.
4.2 Measure of Brand Strength
Our study of brand loyalty de￿nes brand loyalty as the price di⁄erential needed to make a
consumer who prefers one brand switch to a less preferred brand (Pessemier, 1959). Conve-
niently, this measure of brand loyalty is captured by the product-preference term (constant)
in the RCL speci￿cation described above. By estimating the RCL over purchase occasion,
time, and household we are able to recover unbiased estimates of each household￿ s preference
for each brand. Therefore, we use each household￿ s preference (￿hb) as a measure of brand
strength (Agrawal, 1996). We obtain the measure of brand strength for brand b by taking the
average over every household￿ s preference for that brand which we￿ ll denote ￿b. In this way,
our measure of brand strength, ￿b, is able to capture the attitudinal and behavioral aspects
of brand loyalty described above. Furthermore, we use this measure of brand strength to de-
termine the number of consumers who prefer that brand, or the brand￿ s "size." Our method
di⁄ers from that of Agrawal (1996) in that our brand strength is estimated for household
h and brand b which provides a richer set of data with which to estimate the relationship
between brand strength and retailer￿ s promotional strategies. Furthermore, our estimates of
brand strength are computationally easier compared to the semiparametric alternatives he
uses, while still accounting for household speci￿c heterogeneity. Consequently, our method
15guarantees strength and size estimates for each brand in the category, which is essential for
testing the hypotheses of the theoretical brand loyalty model.
A precondition to explaining the frequency and depth of retail price promotions as they
relate to brand loyalty is that brand loyalty indeed exists within the category (Huang, Perlo⁄,
and Villas-Boas, 2006). If the households within our sample have no preference for one brand
over another then our empirical tests of H1 and H2 cannot be carried out. As a result, our
￿rst hypothesis test will be
￿ H0: no brand loyalty exists among the brands.
Since ￿b measures the average strength of brand b it follows that if ￿b = 0 8b then
our model would suggest no brand loyalty exists among the brands, because on average the
household wouldn￿ t prefer any one brand over another. If we fail to reject H0; then the model
wouldn￿ t be suitable to test hypotheses H1 and H2. If we reject H0 then we can empirically
explain the frequency and depth of retail price promotions as they relate to brand strength.
In order to estimate the relationship between brand strength and price promotions, we
specify a second-stage regression model in which the retailer￿ s promotion strategy is a function
of brand strength. De￿ning the discount o⁄ered by a retailer as the percentage change in
prices from one week to the next, we use the actual percentage decrease as a measure of the
depth of the retail promotion. If we regress brand b￿ s strength on the measure of promotion
depth, we are able to test the central hypothesis of the study, namely that the average price
discount at the retail level is negatively related to the strength of brand loyalty. Therefore,
the estimated model becomes:
dbt = ￿d0 + ￿d1prefb + ￿d2sizeb (7)
where prefb is the strength of brand b; dbt is the depth of the discount o⁄ered on brand b at
week t; sizeb is the percentage of households who prefer brand b; and ￿d0 is the intercept of
the model that accounts for the depth of the discount when brand strength and size aren￿ t
present.3 This speci￿cation allows us to test H1, namely, if ￿d1 > 0 then the depth of the
price discount at the retail level is negatively related to the strength of brand loyalty. Since
3Recall that we expanded the choice set to include all possible combinations of purchases within the
category. For this stage of the model we will only use the actual brand estimates and not the expanded choice
observations since they are aggregates of the other brands.
16the discount is negative by de￿nition, and brand strength is positive, it follows that ￿d1 > 0
implies an inverse, or negative, relationship. If however, ￿d1 < 0 then we would reject H1.
Furthermore, this speci￿cation will allow us to investigate the relationship of the brand￿ s
marketshare and the depth of the retail discount.
We develop a similar test for the frequency of price promotions. We de￿ne promotion
frequency as the average number of times the brand is discounted at least 10% from one day to
the next each week. Similar to the approach described above, we then regress the strength
and size of each brand on the measure of promotional frequency. We model frequency
promotion as follows:
fbt = ￿f0 + ￿f1prefb + ￿f2sizeb (8)
where fbt is the promotional frequency for brand b during week t; prefb and sizeb are again
the strength and size of brand b, and ￿f0 is the intercept of the model that accounts for
the frequency of the discount when brand strength and size aren￿ t present. Estimating this
model allows us to test H2. More speci￿cally, if ￿f1 > 0 then the frequency of retail price
promotions is positively related to the strength of brand loyalty. Because fbt; and prefb are
positive values, a positive coe¢ cient estimate suggests that frequency rises as the strength
of loyalty rises. This positive relationship comes from the asymmetry in loyalties derived by
Raju, Srinivasan, and Lal, (1990), namely that lw ￿ m2
wr and ls ￿ ms(r ￿lw)(1+msmw)￿1.
From this it follows that the probability of the weaker brand obtaining the consumers loyal to
the stronger brand is zero, which suggests that the retailer will promote the stronger brand
more frequently. If, on the other hand, we ￿nd that ￿f1 ￿ 0 then we reject H2 and conclude
that this asymmetry doesn￿ t hold in the RTE cereal industry. If H1 and H2 are supported
then our empirical ￿ndings provide evidence that the theoretical model developed above is
representative of the RTE cereal category and may serve as a basis for other theoretical
derivations of brand loyalty. A summary of our tests for the frequency and depth of retail
price promotions is as follows:
￿ H0: No brand loyalty exists among any of the brands. (￿b = 0 8b)
￿ H1: The average price discount at the retail level is negatively related to the strength
of brand loyalty. (￿d1 > 0)
17￿ H2: The frequency of price promotions at the retail level is positively related to the
strength of brand loyalty. (￿f1 > 0)
5 Estimation Method
In this section we explore the estimation method used to estimate the above models. Fol-
lowing Agrawal (1996) we estimate (7) and (8) using Joint Generalized Least Squares (SUR)
estimation technique, which results in more e¢ cient, though identical, estimates compared
to OLS estimation. The SUR takes into account the correlation in error terms across the
equations. There are several complications to address when estimating equation (6) above.
First, the unobserved factors are correlated over time within each household. Maximum
likelihood estimates will provide consistent estimates of the endogeneity of the households
unobserved factors by allowing the coe¢ cients on the decision to vary randomly. Second,
the probability equation cannot be estimated using ordinary least squares because there is
no closed form for the equation. Simulated maximum likelihood uses Monte Carlo simula-
tion to solve the integral in (6) up to an approximation that is accurate to the number of
random draws chosen, R: Finally, some of the unobserved factors may be correlated with
the explanatory variables. As a result the demand model is estimated using the method of
simulated maximum likelihood. This method provides consistent parameter estimates under
general error assumptions and is readily able to accommodate complex structures regarding
household heterogeneity. As models of this form can be quite computationally burdensome
we implore a Halton draw sequence. This sequence signi￿cantly cuts down on the number of
draws with no degradation to simulation performance (Bhat, 2003). We found that R = 200
draws are su¢ cient to produce stable estimates without excessive estimation time.
6 Data Description
In this section we describe the data used for the econometric model developed in section
4. The empirical estimation requires data on prices, product characteristics, and household
demographics. Wind and Lerner (1979) ￿nd that self-reported survey data is often unreliable
as it is dependent on the recalling of purchase events from memory. Consequently this study
uses a household panel data gathered by A.C. Nielson. A.C. Nielson, Inc.￿ s "HomeScan"
data has participating households submit all food purchase information (price, quantity,
18along with a product description) each time they visit any type of retail food outlet. The
homescan database also includes a number of socioeconomic and demographic descriptors.
We use all shopping trips from the beginning of 2006 to the end of 2006. This time period
is long enough to observe several category purchases, while short enough to assume the
household￿ s preferences haven￿ t changed over time. Using such a detailed household sample
should provide su¢ cient empirical data to determine how a household￿ s brand loyalty a⁄ects
a retailer￿ s equilibrium promotional strategy for di⁄erentiated products.
As mentioned above the RTE cereal industry ￿ts well with the purposes of this study
due to the high frequency of purchase, and ￿erce brand rivalry. We randomly select 1020
households who made at least two purchase within the RTE cereal industry. Selecting the
households at random from the homescan data should give us a representative sample of
US consumer buying habits. In table 2 we present the demographic information from the
Current Population Survey (CPS) for 2006 and compare it to the surveyed households of the
A.C. Nielson Homescan data. We can see from table 2 that the demographics of the A.C.
Nielson households match those of U.S. households quite well. As a result, we suggest that
our randomly sampled population is a representative sample of U.S. households
Insert Demographic Table Here
The variety of brands available in the RTE cereal industry poses a bit of a problem
because product speci￿c attributes must be available on every brand the household might
consider purchasing. As a result, we select only those brands within the RTE industry with
the highest marketshare. By selecting the most popular brands in the category we increase
the probability a randomly selected household made a purchase. We ￿ll in the information
on brands the household didn￿ t purchase using purchases made by other households in the
same geographic area, the same day, and if the same day isn￿ t available, the same week.
By selecting the most popular brands we increase the richness of the information on choices
not selected by the household. The brands selected were General Mills￿Cheerios, Kelloggs￿
Frosted Mini-Wheats, General Mills￿Honey Nut Cheerios, Post￿ s Honey Bunches of Oats,
Kelloggs￿Frosted Flakes, and General Mills￿Cinnamon Toast Crunch. These brands tend
to have the highest marketshare of all brands, which results in high incidences of purchase.
Summary statistic on the brands used in the dataset can be found in table 3, including how
19often the brands were purchased by the households throughout 2006 and the prices of each
brand (in cents per ounce).
Insert RTE summary stats. Table Here
6.1 Multiple Discreteness
It is well known that the choice set of discrete choice models must exhibit alternatives which
are mutually exclusive from the decision maker￿ s perspective (Train, 2003). In other words,
choosing one alternative necessarily means another cannot be chosen. For many of the
product categories found in retail grocery outlets consumers regularly purchase assortments
of products and di⁄erent brands within the product categories. The marketing literature
provides several explanations as to the reason consumers might make several purchases within
a particular category. McAlister (1982) found that consumers seek variety over time and
in so doing switch their consumption of several di⁄erent ￿ avors. Consequently this form of
variety seeking would induce a consumer to select an assortment of alternatives. Similarly,
if households are unsure of their future tastes at the time of consumption they may purchase
an assortment to ensure they have the right variety on hand (Hauser and Wernerfelt, 1990;
Simonson, 1990; and Walsh, 1995). This could be particularly true if the household has
several members and the purchasing member of the household is unsure of the other member￿ s
tastes.
This multiple discreteness violates the mutual exclusivity assumption of discrete choice
models. This misspeci￿cation would produce incorrect measures of consumer response to
marketing mix variables. Recognizing the di⁄erence between the time of purchase and the
time of consumption, Dube (2005) accounts for multiple discreteness by modeling the number
of consumption occasions the household faces during each shopping trip. Thereby suggesting
that only one product is being consumed at a particular time. In this way they are able
to develop a "vertical" variety-seeking model that accounts for multiple discreteness within
category purchases. Hendel (1999) models the di⁄erent tasks the consumer is going to use
the di⁄erent brands for. In so doing he is able to account for multiple discreteness within
a RCL model. Bhat (2005) proposes a simple, parsimonious model to account for other
choice occasions such as time allocation to di⁄erent types of discretionary activities. He
describes the decision process as "horizontal" variety-seeking, where the consumer selects an
20assortment of alternatives due to diminishing marginal returns for each alternative. In so
doing Dube (2005) and Bhat (2004) are able to take into account total demand elasticities.
The theoretical structure requirements proposed by Hendel (1999), Dube (2005), and Bhat
(2005) impose too many restrictions on the underlying utility model to be entirely useful for
our case. As a result we follow Train, McFadden, and Ben-Akiva, (1987) and expand the
choice set such that each possible portfolio of choices is a distinct alternative.4 Expanding the
choice set essentially ignores the complementarity between the two products being purchased
since buying two together is fundamentally di⁄erent from buying one and then the other.
Since we are trying to identify the degree of brand loyalty for each product, we don￿ t need to
consider total demand elasticities. As we can see in table 3 the real gain from expanding the
choice set doesn￿ t come from the measure on the newly introduced choices, but rather from
the increasing number of households and their corresponding brand purchases. For example,
if a household bought Cheerios every time and once bought Cheerios and something else, their
observations couldn￿ t be used in our discrete choice model. Whereas now we can include
those observations. Furthermore, this is still consistent with utility maximization because
we￿ re looking at households, the overall utility of the household is greater when buying two
products together, as opposed to only one. Within the dataset if we had restricted the data
to be only those households who purchased a single brand each trip we would have used 877
households (N = 26;904). By expanding the choice set to include households that made
at least one purchase within the category, we are able to observe the purchasing habits of
1020 households in total (N = 76;024). By increasing the number of choices from 6 brands
to 13 we have 5848 observations per choice. As a result, expanding the choice set allows
us to include those households that make more than one brand purchase, adding valuable
information to the analysis.
7 Empirical Results and Discussion
In this section, we present the results obtained from estimating the three equations that
comprise the strategic price-promotion model as it pertains to brand loyalty and draw several
implications for the further study. We ￿rst present and discuss the demand-system estimates
4In fact we only had to expand the choice set by those combinations of brands that were actually purchased,
which was sign￿cantly less than all the possible combinations.
21that empirically determine the level of preference each household has for each brand. With
estimates of brand strength we ￿rst test H0 that states there is no brand strength among
the products, and if rejected, we￿ ll proceed to test the other hypotheses. Using the demand
estimates we calculate the e⁄ect brand loyalty has on the depth and breadth of retailer
promotions. In so doing we￿ ll look at the hypothesis that the average price discount at the
retail level is negatively related to the strength of brand loyalty (H1) and the hypothesis that
the frequency of price promotions at the retail level is positively related to the strength of
brand loyalty (H2).
As a ￿rst step to interpreting the demand model results we test the validity of the RCL
model in general, and against the simpler logit speci￿cation as discussed in the estimation
section. Several tests exist that allow us to investigate how well the model ￿t the data and
whether or not a RCL speci￿cation is preferred over the simpler multinomial logit form in
which the parameters are ￿xed. The likelihood ratio index is often used with discrete choice
models to measure how well the model ￿t the data. If the estimated model is not any better
than no model at all the we￿ ll ￿nd that likelihood ratio index is very close to zero. We
￿nd that the log-likelihood ratio index for the RCL model is 0:49 which means that our RCL
model ￿ts the data better than a model containing no parameters: Furthermore in comparing
the log-likelihood ratio index against the simpler logit model we ￿nd that the simpler model
has a likelihood ratio index of 0:02 which implies that, given the same parameters and data,
the RCL model ￿ts the data better than the simple logit model. The main di⁄erence between
the two models is their ability to handle household heterogeneity. If no heterogeneity exists
in the model then the coe¢ cients ￿￿; ￿￿; and ￿￿ will all equal zero and the RCL will collapse
into the simple logit model. As we can see in table 4 several of the coe¢ cients are statistically
di⁄erent from zero. Consistent with Jain, Vilcassim, and Chintagunta (1994) this suggests
that heterogeneity exists in the data and not accounting for it would provide biased estimates
of brand strength. Therefore we conclude that the RCL model ￿ts that data better than the
simple logit model and we will use these estimates to interpret household demand.
In the demand model, the parameters of interest are the own-price e⁄ect, the discount-
e⁄ect, the discount-price interaction term, and the average intrinsic preference for brand b.
The own-price e⁄ect, measured by the marginal utility of income, is negative as expected.
Consistent with the theoretical model this suggests that the households will have some reser-
22vation price r, at which they will no longer make a purchase. We obtain the estimate of the
marginal utility of income by averaging each household￿ s estimate. In table 4 we can see
that the coe¢ cients on both the discount-e⁄ect, and the discount-price interaction term are
not statistically signi￿cant. Within the context of the model this implies that discounting
doesn￿ t have a signi￿cant a⁄ect on which brand the household purchases. We￿ ll now pro-
ceed to test H0 which states that no brand strength exists among the brands (￿b = 0 8b).
The results in table 4 show that several of the brands are statistically di⁄erent from zero,
which suggests that on average, households have some preference for one brand over another.
We therefore reject H0 and conclude that the households used for the sample exhibit brand
loyalty.
Insert Demand Results Table Here
The parameter estimates in table 4 provide valuable information on the RTE cereal in-
dustry. Recall from section 4 we normalized brand N out. As a result our estimates in
table 4 are the average brand preference for brand b relative to brand N: In our case brand
N happens to be the option of purchasing both Honey Bunches of Oats, and Cheerios in one
shopping trip. From table 4 we can see Cheerios is the most preferred brand, which would
be expected given it has the highest marketshare of any RTE cereal brand. Honey Bunches
of Oats is the second highest preferred brand, and we ￿nd that the choice of purchasing both
Honey Bunches of Oats and Cheerios is the preferred choice over any other choice combina-
tions, which is consistent with the model￿ s overall results. Furthermore, it seems that on
average, households prefer to choose one brand at a time with the exception of Cinnamon
Toast Crunch. Given the overall signi￿cance of the brand preference estimates, we can use
these to estimate the strength of each brand and test H1 and H2.
Using the estimates from the RCL model we calculate each household￿ s preference for
brand b: The results of the Joint Generalized Least Squares estimates of the discount model
are presented in table 5. We￿ ll ￿rst look at the overall ￿t of the model to the data. We ￿nd
that the R2 is 0:059 which indicates that the brand strength and size only account for 5.9%
of the depth of the retailer discount. We can test the overall signi￿cance of the model using
a F-test. We see in table 5 that the model￿ s F-statistic is 4:50. The corresponding test
statistic at the 95% level of signi￿cance is 3:025 given a numerator of 2, and a denominator
23of 310. Since our F-statistic is greater than 3:025 we can reject the null hypothesis that all
of the parameters are equal to zero. Given the signi￿cance of the model overall we￿ ll use
these estimation results to test H1.
Insert Discount Regression Table Here
The primary parameters of interest in table 5 are ￿d1, and ￿d2. If ￿d1 > 0 then the depth
of the price discount at the retail level is negatively related to the household￿ s preference
of brand b: From the discount model estimates we can see that ￿d1 > 0 and statistically
signi￿cant at the 95% level of signi￿cance. As a result the estimate of ￿d1 provides evidence
for H1, namely that the depth of the price discount at the retail level is negatively related to
the strength of the brand preference. This suggests that the weaker brand will be promoted
deeper than a stronger brand which provides evidence towards the promotional equilibrium
of our theoretical model. This also provides evidence for the measurement of brand loyalty.
Note that if H1 were rejected it would suggest that the stronger brand would be promoted
deeper than the weaker in order to attract the loyal customers of the weaker. This would
fundamentally contradict our de￿nition and distinction of the stronger and weaker brands.
As a result, by not rejecting H1 we provide evidence of Pessemiers￿(1959) de￿nition of brand
loyalty and conclude that it is a reasonable assumption for the RTE cereal industry. Further-
more, it provides evidence to suggest that the duopoly model may extend to a multiproduct
market. From table 5 we also see that the e⁄ect the size of the loyal cohort has on the depth
of the discount is insigni￿cant. Since ￿d2 is not statistically di⁄erent from zero it follows
that the size of brand b￿ s loyal cohort doesn￿ t have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the depth of its
promotion. We test our model further by investigating the relationship of brand strength
and promotional frequency.
The demand estimates shown in table 4 form the key inputs to the second-stage promo-
tional frequency model estimates shown in table 6. The results of the Joint Generalized Least
Squares estimates of the frequency model are presented in table 6. While looking at the ￿t
of the model to the data we ￿nd that the R2 is only 0:02, which indicates that the brand￿ s
strength and size account for very little in the variation of the promotional frequency. We
can test the overall signi￿cance of the model using the F-statistic which we can see is 4:01.
The corresponding test statistic at the 95% level of signi￿cance is 3:025 given a numerator
24of 2 and a denominator of 310. Since our F-statistic is greater than 3:025 we can reject the
null hypothesis that all of the parameters are equal to zero and proceed to test H2.
Insert Frequency Regression Table Here
In table 6 the primary parameters of interest are ￿f1; and ￿f2 which measure the e⁄ect
the brand￿ s strength and marketshare (size) has on the frequency of promotion. If ￿f1 > 0
then the frequency of price promotions at the retail level is positively related to the strength
of brand loyalty. The results in table 6 indicate that ￿f1 < 0 and statistically signi￿cant at
the 95% level of signi￿cance. As a result we reject H2 and conclude that the frequency of
price promotions at the retail level is negatively related to the strength of brand loyalty. This
is in contrast to our theoretical model developed in the 3rd section. Within the theoretical
model￿ s context this would suggest that the weaker brands are promoted more frequently
than the stronger brand. This suggests that the probability of the weaker brand obtaining
the loyal consumers of the stronger brand is not zero. Thus the asymmetry of loyalties derived
by Raju, Srinivasan, and Lal￿ s (1990) model does not hold within the RTE cereal category.
Furthermore, we see from table 6 that the estimate of the brand￿ s size is not statistically
di⁄erent from zero. This would suggest that the marketshare of a brand is not an indicator
of the depth or frequency a brand will be promoted at the retail level.
Our result suggest that there is a high degree of brand loyalty within the RTE cereal
industry and the data does not fully support the patterns suggested by our theoretical model.
By rejecting H2 we conclude that the theoretical model developed above is not a representative
model of brand loyalty in the RTE cereal category. However, our empirical results do con￿rm
those of Agrawal (1996) and suggest that the promotional depth of a retailer￿ s discount is
negatively related to the strength of brand loyalty. In other words, deeper discounts are
given for weaker brands if the wholesale price o⁄ered for that brand is low enough to warrant
a higher pro￿t by selling the weaker at the discounted rate to the entire market. This
empirical result supports our de￿nition, and distinction between the stronger and weaker
brands, namely that lw ￿ ls. Furthermore, our empirical results suggest that the brand￿ s
marketshare is insigni￿cant in determining the depth and breadth of retail promotions.
Our results also suggest that the weaker brands are promoted more frequently than the
stronger brands. In other words, the frequency of price promotions at the retail level is
25negatively related to the strength of the brand. This suggests that the asymmetry of our
theoretical model￿ s loyalties, namely that lw ￿ m2
wr and ls ￿ ms(r ￿ lw)(1 + msmw)￿1
as shown by Raju, Srinivasan, and Lal, (1990), does not hold for the RTE cereal category
because the weaker brand is able to capture the marketshare of the stronger brand with a
probability greater than zero. Otherwise the retailer would promote the stronger brand more
frequently. Therefore it follows that this assumption is not suitable for brand loyalty models
in the RTE cereal category and should be reconsidered in further research.
8 Conclusion and Implications
Though brand loyalty has been studied extensively in the marketing literature, the rela-
tionship between brand loyalty and equilibrium pricing strategies is not well understood.
Retailer￿ s promotional decisions are critically dependent upon how many consumers can be
convinced to switch to a brand by temporarily reducing its price, and how many are in-
stead brand loyal. Theoretical models of how the size and strength of brand loyalty in￿ uence
optimal promotion strategies have been developed, but there are no rigorous tests of their
hypotheses. As a result we empirically determine how brand loyalty changes retailer￿ s equi-
librium promotional strategy for di⁄erentiated products.
We develop and test a theoretical model of brand loyalty that resembles many of the
fundamental characteristics of theoretical brand loyalty studies. In our empirical estimation
we use a random coe¢ cient logit model to estimate the intrinsic preference each household
has for each brand. Estimating the random coe¢ cient logit model using simulated maximum
likelihood provides consistent estimates of the mean household preference while accounting
for the heterogeneity among households. Using household panel data we applied the em-
pirical test to the purchases made by the households throughout the US during 2006. By
applying our random coe¢ cient logit model to this rich panel data we were able to empirically
investigate retail promotion strategies.
The result suggest that there is a high degree of brand loyalty within the RTE cereal
category and the data does not fully support the patterns suggested by our theoretical model.
We conclude that the theoretical model developed above is not a representative model of
brand loyalty in the RTE cereal category. Our results suggest that the average price discount
at the retail level is negatively related to the strength of brand loyalty as implied by the
26theoretical model. In other words, deeper discounts are given for weaker brands if the
wholesale price o⁄ered for that brand is low enough to warrant a higher pro￿t by selling
the weaker at the discounted rate to the entire market. These empirical result supports our
de￿nition, and distinction between the stronger and weaker brands. However, contrary to the
maintained hypothesis of many studies in retailing our results also suggest that the weaker
brands are promoted more frequently than the stronger brand. In other words, the frequency
of price promotions at the retail level is negatively related to the strength of the brand. It
therefore follows that assumptions of theoretical brand loyalty models that concluded that
the frequency of price promotions at the retail level is positively related to the strength of
the brand should be reconsidered in future research when being applied to the RTE cereal
category.
Though our results have implications for future work with models of retail price pro-
motion, there is much that remains for the study of both theoretical and empirical models.
Future empirical research would bene￿t by empirically studying the e⁄ect a price sensitive
segment would have on the retailer￿ s promotional strategies. The size of a price sensitive
segment may provide insight into the degree of brand loyalty within the market and the
overall incentives of a retailer and their potential strategic interaction within that market.
Future research would also bene￿t by considering, empirically, the e⁄ect trade deals have
on a promotional equilibrium. Our empirical model wasn￿ t able to estimate the retail pass
through and trade deals as a result of the household speci￿c data. However, methods have
been proposed that a suggest ways to estimate the trade deals given to retailers.5 Incorpo-
rating this into empirical studies of brand loyalty would reveal valuable information on the
retailer￿ s strategic interaction within the market and their overall incentive to o⁄er a price
promotion. The empirical evidence from such a study would be able to distinguish between
a retailer￿ s incentive of a larger margin, and the competitive nature of the market in general.
Future theoretical research in the study of retailer promotional strategies may bene￿t by
investigating the theoretical rami￿cations of a market that consists of more than two brands.
Since most retail markets inherently have more than two products the applications certainly
exist. In so doing one could investigate the possibility of complementary products and their
e⁄ect on retailers promotional decisions in the marketplace. Future theoretical research may
5This includes Richards, Pofahl, and Hamilton (2007).
27also bene￿t from looking at the dynamic long run game theoretic aspects of promotional
strategies. This would allow models to relax the assumption that the manufacturer sets
prices simultaneously, and assume a sequential price setting. This would be a more realistic
assumption and would allow theoretical applications to investigate the e⁄ect trade deals
would have on the opposing manufacturer and the resulting equilibrium. Lastly, it would
also be reasonable to assume that manufacturers are aware of the wholesale price of several
products within the market. Since many highly concentrated industries have only a few
manufacturers selling multiple products it follows that they would know the wholesale price
of some portion of the products within the market. This would allow researchers to model
the possibility that a manufacturer to promote several of their own brands at the same in
order to attract the marketshare away from a competing brand.
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35Table 1: Brand Market Share by Volume and Price summary Statistics.
Price Index (2000 is base year)
Variable 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
CPI 172.2 177.1 179.9 184 188.9 195.3 201.6
All RTE Cereals 304.6 288.3 285.8 283.3 267.6 255.0 245.6
Private Label 190.7 190.0 190.0 183.4 174.2 166.6 165.3
Gereal Mills Brands
Cheerios 343.2 324.3 317.3 311.6 290.6 301.6 290.0
(9.8) (9.4) (8.4) (8.5) (7.4) (6.5) (6.9)
Honey Nut Cheerios 320.1 302.8 294.2 291.1 275.4 276.4 270.5
(0.0) (2.9) (4.3) (3.9) (4.0) (3.4) (4.0)
Cinnamon Toast Crunch 350.6 316.6 308.0 298.3 283.0 271.0 256.1
(1.5) (1.7) (1.8) (1.8) (1.3) (0.9) (0.9)
Lucky Charms 330.2 322.6 305.0 304.8 282.1 278.0 264.2
(0.0) (1.1) (1.1) (1.1) (0.8) (0.5) (0.4)
Yogurt Burst Cheerios - - - - - 356.8 326.8
(0.0) (0.2)
Total Whole Grain 468.9 439.6 451.2 404.6 391.6 381.3 359.5
(0.2) (0.2) (0.1) (0.2) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2)
Kellogg￿ s Brands
Frosted Mini-Wheats 234.1 223.9 225.2 232.5 219.6 215.7 211.7
(5.9) (5.1) (4.1) (3.5) (4.0) (4.8) (5.7)
Frosted Flakes 237.8 219.4 220.2 211.1 204.8 206.8 203.5
(7.4) (8.1) (6.7) (6.1) (3.9) (3.0) (2.6)
Raisin Bran 214.9 203.2 203.9 205.3 193.9 186.1 182.3
(4.0) (4.2) (2.8) (2.1) (1.5) (1.5) (1.4)
Rice Krispies 352.5 325.0 308.6 315.5 303.0 297.0 300.0
(1.6) (1.6) (1.2) (1.3) (0.9) (0.8) (0.8)
Special K Red Berry - 482.8 470.7 434.1 389.7 352.3 339.2
(0.2) (0.6) (0.8) (0.5) (0.4) (0.5)
Fruit Loops 288.9 276.8 266.0 347.2 273.8 268.8 259.5
(1.5) (1.7) (1.0) (1.1) (0.7) (0.5) (0.5)
Post￿ s Brands
Honey Bunches of Oats 299.5 268.0 263.8 239.9 247.2 230.8 220.1
(1.6) (2.1) (4.6) (4.4) (4.5) (4.8) (5.5)
Raisin Bran - 219.9 195.9 188.7 163.4 158.2 149.9
(0.0) (0.9) (0.8) (0.9) (0.8) (0.9)
Grape Nuts - 218.6 183.9 186.2 179.8 176.5 167.0
(0.0) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.3)
Selects 325.9 315.1 298.6 302.8 275.6 259.6 247.9
(0.2) (0.3) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
Trail Mix Crunch - - - - - 253.5 274.9
(0.0) (0.2)
Honey-Comb 275.7 268.0 254.7 250.8 233.8 230.0 230.1
(0.6) (0.5) (0.5) (0.4) (0.2) (0.1) (0.1)
All Price are in cents per pound.
Brand marketshare are in parathenses.
36Table 2: Demographic distribution of surveyed households and US households.
% Households % Households
Variable Homescan CPS
Income Bracket
Less than 29,999 26.55 28.12
30,000 to 39,999 13.91 12.08
40,000 to 49,999 13.40 9.21
50,000 to 59,999 10.15 9.41
60,000 to 99,999 24.95 23.75
100,000 to 149,999 8.19 10.41











37Table 3: RTE Cereal Summary Statistics.
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Percentage Purchased
Overall 0.077 0.266 0.0 1.000
Honey Bunches Oats 0.235 0.424 0.0 1.000
Cheerios 0.239 0.426 0.0 1.000
Cinnamon Toast Crunch 0.058 0.234 0.0 1.000
Honey Nut Cheerios 0.142 0.350 0.0 1.000
Frosted Flakes 0.121 0.326 0.0 1.000
Frosted Mini Wheats 0.168 0.374 0.0 1.000
Cheerios, and Honey Nut Cheerios 0.007 0.082 0.0 1.000
Frosted Flakes, and Frosted Mini Wheats 0.005 0.071 0.0 1.000
Honey Bunches of Oats, and Frosted Mini Wheats 0.005 0.070 0.0 1.000
Honey Nut Cheerios, and Frosted Mini Wheats 0.007 0.081 0.0 1.000
Cheerios, and Frosted Mini Wheats 0.005 0.068 0.0 1.000
Honey Bunches of Oats, and Honey Nut Cheerios 0.004 0.067 0.0 1.000
Honey Bunches of Oats, and Cheerios 0.004 0.063 0.0 1.000
Price
Overall 17.762 5.939 4.710 110.460
Honey Bunches Oats 16.796 6.168 4.714 110.462
Cheerios 20.847 7.815 6.250 80.000
Cinnamon Toast Crunch 18.848 6.509 5.462 86.000
Honey Nut Cheerios 19.409 7.132 6.630 107.778
Frosted Flakes 15.496 6.697 5.000 63.810
Frosted Mini Wheats 15.393 5.103 4.853 106.211
Cheerios, and Honey Nut Cheerios 20.128 5.413 8.542 66.714
Frosted Flakes, and Frosted Mini Wheats 15.445 4.244 5.906 59.467
Honey Bunches of Oats, and Frosted Mini Wheats 16.094 4.067 8.125 61.210
Honey Nut Cheerios, and Frosted Mini Wheats 17.401 4.482 7.607 60.855
Cheerios, and Frosted Mini Wheats 18.120 4.716 7.827 61.805
Honey Bunches of Oats, and Honey Nut Cheerios 18.102 4.859 8.063 65.431
Honey Bunches of Oats, and Cheerios 18.821 5.015 8.231 64.681
All Price are in cents per pound.
38Table 4: RTE Cereal Summary Statistics.
Random Coef. Multinomial
Logit Model Logit Model
Variable Estimate t-stat. Estimate t-stat.
Honey Bunches Oats 0.010 0.229 0.032* 0.881
Cheerios 0.016 -0.367 0.036* 1.007
Cinnamon Toast Crunch 0.040 0.925 0.043* 1.166
Honey Nut Cheerios 0.053 1.345 0.054* 1.489
Frosted Flakes 0.038 0.890 0.050* 1.384
Frosted Mini Wheats 0.044 1.071 0.046* 1.264
Cheerios, and Honey Nut Cheerios 0.073 1.351 0.040 0.877
Frosted Flakes, and Frosted Mini Wheats 0.110* 2.322 0.102 2.033
Honey Bunches of Oats, and Frosted Mini Wheats 0.026 0.495 0.023 0.468
Honey Nut Cheerios, and Frosted Mini Wheats 0.086 1.430 0.062 1.339
Cheerios, and Frosted Mini Wheats 0.047 0.786 0.042 0.842
Honey Bunches of Oats, and Honey Nut Cheerios 0.031 0.576 0.027 0.539
Price -0.014* -5.581
Discount Dummy -0.100 -0.881 -0.070 -1.040
Discount Price Interaction -0.003 -0.280 0.003 0.494
Store Feature Dummy 0.002 0.059 -0.103* -3.149
(￿) Means of the Random Parameters
Honey Bunches Oats 2.863* 3.557 3.446 4.933
Cheerios 3.522* 4.222 3.418 4.893
Cinnamon Toast Crunch -0.033 -0.039 1.847 2.566
Honey Nut Cheerios 1.826* 2.445 2.524 3.584
Frosted Flakes 1.127 1.368 2.396 3.393
Frosted Mini Wheats 1.961* 2.530 2.814 4.009
Cheerios, and Honey Nut Cheerios -2.880* -2.700 -0.197 -0.219
Frosted Flakes, and Frosted Mini Wheats -2.074* -2.160 -1.816* -1.746
Honey Bunches of Oats, and Frosted Mini Wheats -0.781* -0.732 -0.223 -0.235
Honey Nut Cheerios, and Frosted Mini Wheats -1.850 -1.540 -0.692 -0.747
Cheerios, and Frosted Mini Wheats -0.747 -0.621 -0.643 -0.652
Honey Bunches of Oats, and Honey Nut Cheerios -2.483 -1.608 -0.394 -0.403
Price -0.032* -6.684
(￿) Std. Deviation of Random Parameter
Honey Bunches Oats 2.542* 19.617
Cheerios 2.907* 22.200
Cinnamon Toast Crunch 2.795* 19.693
Honey Nut Cheerios 2.079* 18.301
Frosted Flakes 2.722* 17.413
Frosted Mini Wheats 1.983* 17.409
Cheerios, and Honey Nut Cheerios 2.218* 9.645
Frosted Flakes, and Frosted Mini Wheats 0.316 0.673
Honey Bunches of Oats, and Frosted Mini Wheats 1.043* 2.102
Honey Nut Cheerios, and Frosted Mini Wheats 1.258* 4.332
Cheerios, and Frosted Mini Wheats 0.008 0.012
Honey Bunches of Oats, and Honey Nut Cheerios 2.111* 4.264
Price 0.083* 15.149
Log-Likelihood Ratio 0.491 0.002







Table 6: Relationship of a Brand￿ s Strength and Size on Frequency.
Variable Estimate T-ratio
￿f0 0.374* 24.981
￿f1 -0.035* -2.053
￿f2 0.209 -1.109
R2 0.02
F-statistic 4.01
40